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Just after I finished college, I worked for a year in a nursing home, and while I 
was in graduate school I returned to the same job during the summer vacations. 
My field of study was philosophy, which I now teach. I had thus read a good 
portion of what philosophers, theologians, and psychologists have written on death 
before I actually encountered fatally ill patients whom I nursed as a nurse’s aid. I 
remember that two things surprised me when I first began to work. One was the 
matter-of-factness, the degree of realism with which most patients foresaw their 
own dying. They talked about it accurately and directly. I had sat through many 
lectures in which the word death was uttered only with a special intonation, but the 
men and women in the wards did not cast down their eyes when they spoke about 
it. The other unexpected feature was the great diversity among their attitudes. Each 
man’s bearing was individuated and sharply defined; it seemed to manifest his 
total character. Each man saw death as singularly as each saw life. 
The fact that these two observations came unexpected to a person with my kind 
of academic training and that they were surprises reflects a general condition of the 
literatures to which I had been exposed. In their writings philosophers, psycholo- 
gists and theologians usually assume that death has but a single, central meaning. 
Their titles often promise that the meaning of death will be revealed; later, that 
meaning is laid down as univocally as one would state a fact. The individual 
differences-if any are acknowledged-are relegated to a lower level. Their diversity 
shows only that men, in their unlikeness, cope with death’s monadic meaning in 
ways that vary and that are peculiar to them. These differences merely represent 
the different reactions that men have to the one unaltering significance of death. 
No one would write like this after working for several weeks in a nursing home. 
Death there never has the same meaning for two patients. Its aspect is as diverse as 
that of life. 
Martin Heidegger’s philosophy is probably the most prominent and extreme 
example of writing in which death is discussed in far-flung generalizations. 
Heidegger not only holds that death has but a single meaning-that of “nihila- 
tion”-but goes further and asserts that this meaning is so absolute and patent that 
life’s own meaning is only the counterpart of it. Life, too, has but a single meaning, 
and it no more than echoes the single meaning that is possessed by death. 
Mortality thereby becomes for Heidegger so central that he fashions his definition 
of man from it: man is the being that anticipates its own death, he is  the 
expectation of his “nihilation.” Therefore, he lives in dread. Dread structures the 
totality of man’s experience, and all attempts to conquer or surmount it remain but 
futile self-deceptions. 
I shall not produce a long list of authors and of titles that also speak of death as 
having but one meaning, though that would be easy. In this essay I do not want to 
measure the disagreement that may exist between me and others. I wish to explore, 
instead, the actual diversity of death’s meanings and give some indication of their 
multiformity. To show how disparately death can be conceived and met is more 
my purpose than disputations or polemics. 
Most of us know in any case that death has different meanings to different men; 
showy refutations of the contrary assumption are not needed. Yet it is one thing to 
know something in the context of practical every-day experience; it is quite another 
862 
Bergmann: The Diversity of Death 863 
to incorporate that knowledge with its train of implications into the body of one’s 
theoretical beliefs and to make it part of one’s abstract and discursive thinking. 
Practice is often wiser than theory; much of our abstract thinking must be educated 
and raised until it attains the discretion that practice reached much sooner. The old 
adage, that we should practice what we believe, needs a twin. We also must 
believe, and learn to believe, what we already practice. 
In the context of practice, we all know very well that death has many meanings, 
but we know it much less well in another context-that of our absrract thinking- 
and least well perhaps when we philosophize about it. The aim of this essay is only 
to bring these two contexts together, to introduce a knowledge that we already 
have in the domain of practice into the sphere of theoretic and philosophic 
thinking. 
Treatises, especially those composed by philosophers, often begin with a general 
definition, as do many of the writings on death. This is a barren start, however, for 
if one tries to conceive death abstractly, if one means to discover what is essential 
to it, one is very apt to find that its irreducible significance is simply that life has an 
end. Irrespective of all personal context and all circumstances, death represents no 
more than the fact that you and I will cease to be, that we will not persist beyond a 
certain limit. If one sets out from th is  rarefied and drained conception, however, 
only a very small range of the possible attitudes toward death comes into view. 
One asks: with what bearing can men encounter the fact that their lives must end? 
The almost inevitable answer is that they can do it with greater or lesser fortitude. 
One may extend this and add that men meet death also with panic or with 
resignation and, of come, also with relief, but this question does not lead one 
much further. It conjures up a kind of continuum that stretches from despair to 
acquiescence, from frantic resistance to the recognition that death can be the lesser 
of two evils, but it gives the impression that these gradations are sufficient, that 
they comprise the possibilities. They do not. There is a host of other aspects under 
which death can be perceived, and these are not determined by the stoutness or 
faintness of one’s heart. They find no place within the order of this continuum and 
need to be defined outside it. To give even a faint conceptual outline of these 
attitudes requires a quite different framework: not one that starts from a posited 
essential significance of death, but one that lays down at the beginning a basic and 
sweeping philosophic distinction, a framework that divides the fact of man’s 
mortality from his more general finitude. 
We often treat man’s mortality not alone as his most constricting limitation; we 
o further and superimpose these notions on each other until they coincide and are 
articulate one and the same condition, yet they are very different, for the fact that I 
must die is clearly but one of the many limitations that confine me. It may be the 
most irreparable and final imitation; it may also be the one that some regard as 
most important, although others might disagree on this point and consider other 
confinements yet more drastic. Still, it is not the whole set of our limitations, but 
only one of them. Even in the dimension of time, death is not the only restriction 
from which I suffer. I am finite in both directions, bordered both in the past and in 
the future. In addition, countless other boundaries circumscribe and hold me. We 
are limited in talent, in our capacity to experience, in our energy and power, in our 
ability to sustain emotions, in our endurance of the repetitious, in space and 
movement, in sympathy and understanding, in intelligence, in passion and in 
perseverance, and in all else. There is nothing that we possess to an infinite degree, 
unless it be our capacity to commit errors. 
This our finitude is so ubiquitous, is so much with us, that our minds boggle if we 
t 1 e same: man is finite; he is mortal; these two become identical. They seem to 
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make the attempt to imagine it away. The difficulties in which medieval 
theologians embroiled themselves when they tried to develop the concept of a 
single truly infinite being are well known. Would it still be an infinity if it were 
bound by the laws of logic? Would its infinite power prevail even over an equally 
infinite resistance? Could any other creature still be free, still act, still will, if there 
were one such being that had omnipotence? These problems were engendered 
when one endeavored to give only an abstract definition of one genuinely 
unlimited being! That measures the impossibility we would encounter were we to 
aim, not only at a thin conceptualization, but at a real envisionment and picture of 
what it might be for us, for humans, to be limitless. By comparison, it is far easier 
to imagine a human life that would still be finite in other ways, yet be infinite in 
the one respect that constitutes mortality. It would be immensely stretched. Ages 
upon ages of youth would be followed by eons of adolescence; after these would 
flow still larger measures of interminable middle age that imperceptibly would turn 
into millenia of slow decrepitude. To imagine it this way is not sheer whimsy, for 
an important question is thereby raised: would one really want this infinitely 
prolonged life if all or even most of one’s presently existing limitations still 
obtained? Would not the rest of our finitude, all our other limitations, even if we 
were healthy, become eventually intolerable, if we had ages upon ages to explore 
them, if we were still the same, no better, but had to live with ourselves forever? 
One could still advance the further question: can one envision any changes that 
would make an infinitely prolonged life acceptable to us? Would we find a life of 
infinite duration supportable even if we were granted other wishes and not just the 
one fairy tale request that we might not die, or would we still weary of it in the far 
distant future, no matter which of our other limitations were abolished? 
The difference between our finitude and our mortality could be elaborated much 
more fully. One might add that our experiences of the two are radically different: 
my finitude is more present to me than my mortality. I chafe against it constantly. 
It is quite ineluctable. In one way or another, everything reminds me of it and 
compels me to give it recognition. This is not nearly as true of my dying. It only 
haunts me, but is not perpetually present. My finitude has also a quite different 
temporal structure. It exists in my past, my present, and my future. It is in my life 
in a way in which my death is not. These cleavages need not be pursued, however, 
for once these two-finitude and mortality-have been distinguished from each 
other, one can transcend the notion that death is met with postures that fall 
somewhere beween panic and acquiescence. One then sees that most men perceive 
death against the background, against the precondition, of their finitude. The 
attitudes of most men toward death cannot be delineated or understood if one 
approaches this task directly, as most philosophers and other writers have. One’s 
conception of death is not simply a response to the fact that life must end. Primary 
is the response to the more encompassing and more present fact of our finitude. 
The significance one gives to death is only an afterthought to that more 
fundamental posture. 
The meanings that men give to death hinge on the meanings they give to their 
lives. The conceptions of death are as variegated and complex as those of life. 
Death has no essence. It has no core of its own. Its substance is all borrowed, is 
wholly circumstance. Its shape is utterly determined by what manner of life it ends. 
We shall illustrate the nature of this complementarity-show how the interpreta- 
tion of one’s life precedes and generates the meaning one discerns in death-with 
three very different examples. Each of these presupposes the distinction between 
mortality and finitude. The response to man’s finitude is in each case more 
fundamental and prior to the meaning with which death i s  invested. At the same 
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time, none of these attitudes fits into the gradations that lie between panic and 
acquiescence. They lie beyond the range that any more direct and frontal approach 
would place in focus. 
The attitudes I shall try to sketch derive from Camus, from the German poet 
Holderlin, and from Nietzsche. Mentioning these names makes it superfluous to say 
that the statistical frequency with which these attitudes occur is not in question; 
neither do I wish to suggest that they are especially admirable and should be 
emulated. To judge them seems to me not of primary importance. My main 
concern is to demonstrate their possibility and to suggest some of the rationale that 
motivates thtm. 
The single idea with which Camus’ name is most powerfully associated is that of 
the Absurd. One often thinks that Camus judged life to be absurd because it ends 
in death, but this is a misconception and one that does him and his existentialism a 
disservice. In The Myth of Sisyphus, Camus defines and describes his notion of the 
Absurd at length, and he makes it quite clear that it is not mortality that makes life 
absurd, but that it is rendered that by a number of other limitations. He illustrates 
the experience of the Absurd with several examples. The most important and most 
forcefully presented of these is his discussion of human intelligence. Camus is 
impressed with and concentrates on the conflict between our passion for lucidity, 
our great thirst for understanding and the inherent untowardness, the insuperable 
paucity and clumsiness of our intellectual tools and procedures. He is struck by the 
accursedness of the human creature: that man, though possessed by a passionate 
drive for understanding, should nevertheless find himself so ill-equipped and 
therefore thwarted. In essence, Camus’ point on this score is that it would be 
tolerable to have the shoddy intellectual endowment of most humans if at the same 
time one did not also want to know much, and that human life would also make 
sense if his intelligence were ample enought to justify the strength of his desire. It 
is the disproportion between these, the fact that man has a monstrous thirst and yet 
receives no more than drops, that renders man’s condition absurd. It would be all 
right if we were only stupid, but to be simultaneously so curious seems perverse. 
The other examples illustrate similar disproportions: man’s desperate search for 
a firm basis to support his actions is mocked by the ambiguities of all his causes 
and the hollowness of his principles. We are aillicted with a need for meaning; the 
universe seems overripe to meet that need, yet it refuses. In one of his best pages, 
Camus likens us to a man who observes from the outside the conversation that 
another carries on behind the glass walls of a telephone booth. As do this man’s 
mimicry and gestures, so everything in us and in the universe calls out for meaning 
and for interpretation, and yet we encounter only silence. It is as if a demon had 
arranged it; the most important needs of man are not answered. He himself seems 
constructed and the universe seems purposely designed to tantalize him. It is to this 
perversity, to these other limitations that Camus’ notion of the Absurd reacts. It 
was not provoked by man’s mortality. 
The attitude that Camus recommended and espoused in response to this 
absurdity he himself called “rebellion,” but that word, too, is easily misunderstood. 
It is best elucidated if we consider Camus’ argument against suicide. The entire 
book, The Myth of Sisyphus, poses the question: Does the absurdity of life require 
of me the act of suicide? Am I obligated to kill myself if I find life too paradoxical? 
Camus answers,“No!’His reason is that suicide would yield to the absurdity of life. 
We should not ‘‘join” the Absurd; we should confront it, face it, and be relentless 
and unmitigating in this. Given the fact that life is absurd, our only honorable 
response lies in our refusal in any way to evade or shirk or palliate that fact. This is 
what pride, what integrity requires. 
In Camus’ judgment, we should not try to give life meaning, for even that 
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constitutes an attempt to soften and to hide the absurdity of life from ourselves. 
The effort to invest life with meaning is not only futile; it is almost disgraceful. It is 
to curry favors, to become obeisant, to recognize a court that has no claim to 
judgment. The disporportion between man’s aspirations and man’s capacities is an 
affront. The enterprise of self-transcendence, of self-perfection becomes ridiculous 
and pathetic in its light. Suicide would be capitulation. Camus responds with scorn, 
with aloofness. It is reminiscent of Homer’s Achilles, who also withdrew after he 
had been affronted by King Agamemnon. Although there is much to be said in 
criticism of Camus, there is a sense of dignity, of man’s worth, even of grandeur in 
his unyielding, unremitting distance from life. One may disagree, but there is 
something commanding in his attitude, just as there is in that of Achilles. 
If this is Camus’ attitude toward man’s finitude-an attitude that is perhaps best 
condensed into the word “scorn”-then we might now make the attempt to sketch a 
conception of death that grows from it, that sees death beyond the foreground of 
this response to man’s finitude 
Camus gave perhaps the single most concentrated and heightened expression of 
it in the closing line to his novel The Stranger. The hero of that novel, Meursault, 
anticipating his imminent execution, says of the crowd of spectators, “They shall 
greet my death with howls of execration.” That line is memorable for its venom. 
To Meursault, life was without rhyme or reason. He is not Camus’ hero, but an 
exemplification of the human condition. He lived-not well, not badly-until, as 
Sartre has said, life began to stalk him. A succession of circumstances linked up 
with each other, and he commits a murder. That act is itself absurd. It is 
momentary, sudden, committed for no deep reason, and yet sufficient to define and 
brand him, to deliver him to judgment. The point is not that Meursault is innocent 
or guilty; it is rather that the way in which these things happen should affront us. 
The nature of Meursault’s trial is similarly absurd: he did commit a murder, but 
that is not what he is condemned for. The jury finds him guilty because Meursault’s 
attitude toward his mother’s funeral offends them. This man says, “They shall greet 
my death with howls of execration.” 
He flings his life down like a gauntlet. With insolence and indignation, he spits it 
back into the crowd’s, the world’s, face. Trapped, taunted, hoaxed by life, guilty 
and innocent, but above all outraged, his supreme response is his death, the 
highest, topping counterinsult that he can deliver. It is his way of besting the 
affrontery of man’s condition. 
Socrates said that to live is to be ill for a long time. Camus might have said that 
to live is to be degraded. His response to that degradation was not to seek to stem 
the tide, not to salvage scraps. The point of living was to better the instruction, to 
rise above and top the insolence of life. In that perspective, one’s death could be 
one’s final and triumphant answer. That would be one way of dying that does not 
lie between despair and acquiescence. 
Let me now turn to one of Holderlin’s poems.* 
A single summer grant me, great powers, and 
A single autumn for fully ripened song 
That, sated with the sweetness of my 
Playing, my heart may more willingly die. 
*I quote Holderlin’s poem in a translation by Walter Kaufmann. My remarks on it, and 
the present essay, owe much to the chapter on “Death” in Walter Kaufmann’s Faith of a 
Heretic, Doubleday & Co., New York, N.Y., 1961. 
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The soul that, living, did not attain its divine 
Right cannot repose in the netherworld. 
But once what I am bent on, what is 
Holy, my poetry, i4 accomplished. 
I shall be satisfied though my lyre will not 
Be welcome then, stillness of the shadow’s world! 
Accompany me down there. Once I 
Lived like the gods, and more is not needed. 
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At the center of this poem lies the thought that to accomplish what one was bent 
on, what is holy to one, is all that matters. More is not needed. After that death is 
welcome. 
The idea that a single summer, or a single autumn, of writing great poetry will 
suffice presupposes a very strong sense of the stark and drastic nature of human 
limitations. HBlderlin, conscious of what it is to be a man, conscious of the 
smallness and insignificance of his being, asks in response to that realization for 
but one thing: that his poetry, his task may be accomplished. Given his finitude, 
given his limitations, it would be pointless for him to endure forever. It is as if 
HBlderlin had surveyed the totality of his being, the small territory that he 
represents, and had said, “If from this plot of ground one splenied harvest can be 
raised, then more than one could hope or ask for has been granted.” 
His attitude toward man’s finitude is totally different from that of Camus. It is 
much humbler and therefore perhaps more appealing. Holderlin is not affronted 
by his finitude. Who is he to find it disgracing? Instead, he looks at himself as a 
small and not very promising quantity of raw material and decides to use it, quite 
literally to consume and to exhaust it. 
One has, I think, to put the matter into such crude language to understand the 
attitude toward death that is here suggested. One can perceive oneself as a quantity 
that has only so much in it, that has only a given sum of potentialities that can be 
used up and depleted. If one sees oneself so, then one can feel that what matters 
most is not to waste that substance. One’s attitude toward death might then derive 
from this more basic attitude in the following fashion. One could see oneself in a 
kind of race with death. If one is fortunate and is given the opportunity to use up 
and exploit most of what one represents, then one does not leave much to death. 
Alternatively, to abandon the somewhat hackneyed metaphor of the race: given 
one’s finitude, and given the notion that it can be used, one can see oneself 
involved in a kind of sharing with death. If one is fortunate, then what one leaves 
to death is as nothing compared to what one gave to others and to what one 
oneself consumed. One leaves to death only the offal, the burnt-out and worthless 
ashes. There is then more than a dash of contempt in one’s attitude toward death. 
There is also an admixture of bemused and even of malicious humor. Poor death, 
it gets only the dregs! 
Now to Nietzsche. One of his leading ideas is the concept that one should live 
one’s life as if one were making a work of art. This, as the other cases, presupposes 
a sense of man’s finitude and of his ubiquitous limitations. We make a work of art 
by rearranging, by imposing style, by heightening some aspects of a limited 
material. This artist’s attitude toward one’s life again gives rise to a concept of 
death that is entwined with it. Nietzsche said that one’s death should come at the 
right time; we all know well that all too often it comes too soon. By contrast, the 
side of Nietzsche’s dictum that is more novel and that stings is that death can also 
come too late. This idea is directly linked to the concept of life as a work of art. If 
living be an artistic creation, then a life lived beyond its limits becomes tasteless as 
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any other work of art that does not know when to finish. Einstein refused the last 
operation that was recommended to him and is reported to have said that it would 
be tasteless to live longer. Niemche also thought that one should try to give a 
positive function to one’s dying; in this he was again led by the notion that life 
should be a work of art. What he had in mind is that a death can close and unify a 
life as the final chords of a great symphony might complete it. His point was not 
that death can sometimes be preferable to protracted suffering, although that is 
true. He affirmed that the aesthetic drive should include even death. It is assigned 
its function in the artistic plan that one might try to foster in one’s life. 
These are three examples. It would be easy to add others that follow the same 
pattern, that also see death, not as a vast and undefined abstraction, but in the 
perspective that a particular interpretation of human finitude created. The heroic 
death requires such an understanding, for the act of sacrificing one’s life 
deliberately for a cause assumes that the inconsiderable extensions of one’s own 
self have been paced off. To sacrifice it gladly, one must have learned that one’s 
own life is small. That knowledge tempers the aspect of one’s death; it divests it of 
lyricism, makes it prosaic, an event in a fixed order. 
The same mirroring occurs when death is experienced as a constantly present 
temptation, when it appears as the seductive alternative to every difficulty, when it 
glows with the promise of relief or liberation. That is the meaning it takes on for 
those who suffer from their individuality, for those who are incessantly disap- 
pointed by themselves and who cannot make their peace with their own 
limitations. There is no need to heap up funher illustrations. Those we have 
adduced indicate with sufficient strength that the question concerning the meaning 
of death is presumptuous. Death is not a universal, independent, and anonymous 
fact that enters identically into every life. It ripens slowly in the center of our 
separate selves, grows from the totality of our being, is personal, and is our own. 
The physician who attends a dying patient-and not only he, but equally all 
others whose professions involve assignments in that sphere-cannot dodge at least 
one clear implication of the fact that death is so multishaped, for that fact places 
him midway between the two horns of a dilemma. We all know the two sides: one 
is the “role,” the other is “sincerity.” The physician or chaplain may either stay on 
the well laid-out paths that convention and decorum measure out for him: he can 
keep his distance and his bedside manner, or he can try to be intimate and 
understanding. The very diversity of death, which we have stressed, makes the 
choice between these two alternatives a true dilemma, for it renders inadequate 
both of these options and leaves us troubled, no matter which of them we choose. 
If the encounter with death obeys no simple stereotype, but is instead acutely 
subtle and specific, then the soothing cliches of the doctor who plays his “role” are 
bound to be grotesquely inappropriate and clumsy. If the true meaning that this 
event has for the patient can hardly be grasped even by those who know him best, 
then the nurse or the physician with a few hand-me-down rules plainly does not 
have a chance. The rote assumptions are apt to be so wide from the facts that the 
patient at best will be treated to the observation of an inapplicable show. If he is 
less fortunate, he will be asked to play his “part,” which he may consent to do, 
though it is burdensome. If things go badly, the “role” the physician plays will hurt 
the patient and, irritated, he may expose it for the fakery it is. The “role” is clearly 
not the answer. However, to abandon the script, to be “direct“ and “understand- 
ing” and “oneself‘ does not work, either, for, in the first place, one does not 
understand. If the experience of death has the kind of structure we suggested, then 
five or six @lances are not much better than one or two. To throw a switch and try a 
little empathy is not enough. To be loose and relaxed does not mean that one 
Bergmann: The Diversity of Death 869 
understands. Real understanding requires a very deep and particular knowledge 
and an intellectual exertion for which most doctors lack both the equipment and 
the time. This is not insulting; poets, too, might not attain it. To give oneself the air 
of comprehension is therefore bound to be no more than a change of “roles”; it 
only substitutes one form of play-acting for another, To become informal because 
one wants to be “sincere” only magnifies the hypocrisy one wishes to escape; if 
anything, it introduces hyporcrisy of an inferior brand, for it denies itself, it makes 
itself up out of the very stuff of which sincerity should be composed. Furthermore, 
what guarantee is there that every patient wishes to exchange intimacies with his 
physician, that he aches for nothing as much as for “understanding”? He may 
prefer pkvacy and a sense of reserve; if a doctor nevertheless forces his “concern” 
and his “sympathy” on him, the patient may well feel that the doctor takes 
advantage of his defenselessness to paw his soul. To drop one’s role may also be a 
self-indulgence that hinders the performance of one’s actual task. One can do some 
things as long as one stays inside the armor of one’s appointed garb. A chaplain, 
for instance, may think that it would be better to meet the patient as “another 
human being.” However, that is very risky, for usually there are several others in 
the situation who know the patient better and whom the patient respects much 
more as human beings. The task such a chaplain takes on can be performed better 
by friends and relatives, but friends and relatives cannot do what the chaplain 
might have done for the patient, if he had not become so “familiar.” Such a 
chaplain therefore risks doing badly what others do already, while his own job 
remains undone. Obviously, neither of these two approaches-neither the “sincere,” 
man-to-man treatment nor the ceremonious role-playing-have much to recom- 
mend them. One adopts them with misgivings because one must, not because 
either of them is appealing. 
To see this more deeply, one should hold this dilemma, this choice between the 
two proverbial evils, against some very general and sweeping cultural considera- 
tions. Ritual always depends on exclusiveness; to function properly, it must be 
unquestioned. It cannot sustain itself if it is one of several competing alternatives. 
It must be alone in its context-a solitary king who answers to no one, who has no 
rivals, who never even dreams of being challenged. As soon as it is no longer the 
only possibility, it loses its stability and its balance; a devolutionary process starts 
to take it downward to its degeneration. Ritual is thus the most fragile and 
vulnerable of things. It needs monopoly to retain its nature. In the presence of 
competition, it becomes something else. If challenged, it either hides its shaken 
confidence behind a spectacular and shrill facade, becomes pompous and 
declamatory and thus transforms itself from genuine ritual into a theatrical show, 
or it withdraws to a more defensible “inner” reality, reforms away the embroidery 
of its appearance, and retains only what seems “rational” and “up-to-date.” In this 
clearing of the decks, it invariably throws overboard its best and most precious 
possessions. It throws out the poem, but keeps the synopsis. It ceases to be ritual 
and becomes prosaic “custom.” 
In cultures less sophisticated and less pluralistic than our own, death is 
surrounded with rituals that function as genuine rituals that have not yet become 
either “show” or “custom.” The whole community lives these rituals, and they 
enjoy an utterly unchallenged acceptance. They grow out of and in turn nourish a 
far more unified interpretation of life and of death. Death, in other words, has not 
been diverse in all ages and all cultures. Far from it. The individuated and 
differentiated perception of it was only augured in by the general individualism of 
our civilization, and this process is anything but complete. The energies of our 
individual thinking modified the substance of inherited, collective representations, 
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but not altogether. What we have is neither fish nor fowl. This is true, both for our 
conceptions of death and for the whole texture of behavior in which it is 
embedded. Tatters of no longer credible ritual are basted to personal and 
subjective material. This makes for the exasperating impasse. One cannot 
altogether dismiss the ritualistic; at the same time, it has been so emasculated that 
to use it makes one pathetic. The nimbus of the ceremonious has been so enfeebled 
that its surface no longer carries. It is no longer sustained by a collective faith; if 
one tries to walk on it, one sinks. Nevertheless, it is also impossible to brush it 
aside. 
The best one can do in this situation is to adopt an attitude that neither strains 
painfully against the ceremonious nor blindly and naively employs it. One can stay 
inside one’s role, but show that one is aware of its clumsiness and inadequacy. One 
can play one’s part, yet at the same time confess that it is no more than this. This, I 
suggest, is what doctors-and not only they-are condemned to. Something of the 
aura that once enveloped the wonder worker, the magician, and the witch still 
clings to them. They cannot fight their way altogether free from this, although that 
aura is by now tawdry and no longer believed. There is no need to do this, for the 
aura still has its uses. The situation between a dying patient and his doctor is 
inherently disproportionate. The patient knows that the doctor really does not 
understand. He also knows that the doctor functions in an institutional framework 
and that he, the patient, remains for him one of hundreds of cases, even while the 
patient confronts his death. If the physician retains his manner, but at the same 
time communicates to the patient his own sense of its limitations, they can both 
admit to this disproportionateness; the lightly worn formality protects both and 
permits both to be honest. 
